This article examines the approach of criminal courts in England and Wales to case management alongside the contradictory pressures placed upon the pre-trial role of the defence advocate, when advising on plea, which have led to the erosion of the adversary ideal. It focuses on the overarching procedural code that 'governs' the relationship between defence lawyers and the judiciary in the conduct of criminal cases (the Criminal Procedure Rules) and draws upon a recent important decision which extends the antipathy of the courts towards adversarial advocacy. The conclusion drawn is that traditional understandings of the adversarial advocate have expired together with the duty of defence lawyers to 'promote fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the client's best interests'.
Introduction
It is a critical test of the freedom inherent in our democratic society that those accused (usually by the State) of committing criminal offences can and should be represented by capable criminal advocates, independent in spirit who, subject to the rules of law and procedure which operate in our courts and to the dictates of professional propriety, are prepared to put the interests of their clients at the forefront and irrespective of personal disadvantage. 
The Problem of the Adversarial Advocate
The celebratory rhetoric traditionally surrounding the defence advocate had two chief dimensions. First, advocates were 'fearless, vigorous and effective' actors independent of the judge and prosecutor. 12 Second, they operated to secure 'the best outcome for the client'. 13 Independence and professional standards allowed barristers, as 'gladiator of the accused' 14 to robustly protect defendants who might acquiesce (as many have 15 ) to pressure coming from the authoritative standpoint of a judge. Nowhere has this pressure been more acute than with the timing of plea.
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In this regard, under the current regime, the CrimPR dictates that at every hearing the court must, where relevant '... take the defendant's plea (unless already done) or if no plea can be taken then find out whether the defendant is likely to plead guilty or not guilty' 17 . This presents a substantial difficulty for the defence where no prosecution evidence (or only a summary of it) has been served. 17 Rule 3.9(2)(b).
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Traditionally, defendants could, without penalty, elect to remain silent and instead see whether the prosecutor produced a case to answer. In addition to being a corollary of the burden of proof, silence in such circumstances, far from indicating guilt, was a prudent decision given that the prosecution case may have been misstated, defective or misplaced.
Indeed, there are a host of genuine circumstances where the accused is not in a position to provide an early account.
In turn, criminal courts were historically supportive in this regard, explaining 'the accused is not bound to give evidence… he can sit back and see if the prosecution have proved their case'. 18 This was a corollary of the classical distinction between factual and legal guilt namely '…that the issue in a criminal trial is always whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, never whether he is innocent '. 19 Understood in this way, the advocate's duty to the client was emphatic:
Counsel has the same privilege as his client, of asserting and defending the client's rights and protecting his liberty or life by the free and unfettered statement of every fact and the use of every argument and observation that can legitimately, according to the principles and practice of law conduce to this end, and any attempt to restrict this privilege should be jealously watched. undermine the armour afforded to the defence, reporting that 'the "adversarial dialectic"
and the "principle of orality" have been elevated to ends in themselves rather than means to get at the truth and also, as a result, discourage modern and more efficient ways of putting evidence before the courts'.
28
Auld's answer was to propose restructuring the role-performance of defence lawyers so that they would become partners to the prosecution and judge in the 'cost-efficient' administration of justice. His recommendation that the rules of criminal procedure be codified was taken up by Parliament who enacted part 7 of the Courts Act which created a single judge-dominated Criminal Procedure Rules Committee. The powers of the Committee were, under section 69(4), to be exercised with a view to securing that:
(a) the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and (b) the rules are both simple and simply expressed.
As we shall argue, these powers are being exercised with a view to securing 'costeffectiveness' rather than 'efficiency' and with 'fairness' no longer a consideration at all.
Case Management under the CrimPR
The CrimPR do more than merely consolidate and simplify rules of procedure. The code fundamentally alters criminal proceedings with the imposition of a framework for duties 28 Auld Review, ch 11, para 9. This view was largely informed by the Association of Chief Police Officers. Indeed, by any defence lawyers' understanding the CrimPR now engages counsel in 'truth' seeking rather than the shibboleth of testing the Prosecution's case, despite the structural realities of criminal procedure which make this an all but impossible task. Indeed, truth-seeking (itself undefined) in this usage is simply a cover for the displacement of adversary justice. Similarly, the right of the defence putting the prosecution to proof in its entirety before closing its case is excoriated as antiquated 43 ; onerous requirements of defence disclosure now ensure lines of 'unexpected' attack in cross-examination can be relabelled 'ambush' and disallowed; 44 and even at the earliest stages of proceedings, the level of prosecution disclosure made available before judicial pressure is applied and a plea 'expected' is ever diminishing. The ability of the defence to consider the prosecution case properly has therefore been impaired and important decisions are increasingly expected to have been made without the ability to properly evaluate the Crown's evidence as opposed to its claims. Nowhere is this exemplified more powerfully than in the case of West.
West: The Adversarial Advocate under the CrimPR
The decision of West warrants reflection because it raises pressing questions regarding the direction that the relationship between defence lawyers and the judiciary in the conduct of criminal cases continues to head. Indeed, the questions arise out of the earliest stage of court proceedings -the Preliminary Hearing.
The Preliminary Hearing
On 14 Following discussion of suitable dates for trial, the Judge continued:
JUDGE KELSON: It would be at a risk that week but then again, having read the This intervention -again evidenced by the italicized phrases -was unprovoked by anything West had said (except his indication that the plea would be Not Guilty) and set in train an exchange that became heated. The barrister explained that he had seen only brief summaries of the interviews and that he had not gone through them with his client.
The Judge persisted: JUDGE KELSON: I think perhaps you should really, to make it a useful hearing. It is difficult to agree. To have arrived at a position in which a judge -who upset the cordial atmosphere which had characterized the proceedings prior to his interventions and presumed (wrongly) that West had failed to take any instructions -had 'proceeded with perfect propriety' mischaracterizes the situation and signals the growing resistance to adversarial advocacy.
Returning to the Preliminary Hearing, having been advised by West that he had 'taken instructions that he is not guilty….', the Judge interrupted:
JUDGE KELSON: Everybody is assumed to be not guilty, but most people are then confronted … by their interviews by any helpful advocate.
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To the outside observer, these remarks might be considered disparaging and gratuitous, a point made emphatic when we contextualize this as an exchange with a member of the independent Bar with courtroom experience approaching some thirty years. West cemented his stated position by underlining that it was not based on any such assumption:
MR WEST: I have had all the time I need. I know that it is going to be a not guilty trial. I do not need to go through the short summaries of the interviews with him to change that position. He tells me he is not guilty. We need to fix a trial date. I do not need any more time, thank you. JUDGE KELSON: I will put this case out till later today when you have conducted a proper conference with your client and we will revisit the case.
MR WEST: I will decide how long I spend in conference with him.
JUDGE KELSON: Mr. West, we will come back to this case after two o'clock.
Forthcoming In fact, as earlier indicated, the solicitor had already met with the accused to discuss the case in a conference which West had some input in preparing. In reply, the Judge sharpened his attitude calling him 'an impertinent barrister' and ordered him to 'sit' (seven times):
JUDGE KELSON: Mr. West, you will be here at 2.15. Now, mind your manners and sit down. Sit down.
MR WEST: Excuse me.
JUDGE KELSON: Sit down, Mr. West, or I will take this further. Sit down.
53 From the full transcript it appears that, following the adjournment, it was not until approximately 3pm that West's case would have been brought back into court, the clerk having to remind the judge that he had not dealt with it.
Forthcoming Forthcoming taken by a Judge on the 'strength' of the 'evidence', namely that the accused is guilty and irrespective of case-load pressure. 59 The chief difficulty with this 'practice' is that this view is based upon a prosecution-minded 'summary'; one constructed to ensure that a prima facie case is readily apparent on the papers. Importantly, evidence favourable to the defence may be excluded, having not been considered properly or disregarded improperly or simply unknown to the prosecution. Furthermore, a 'summary' of evidence has the potential to de-contextualize the facts of the (prosecution) case, rendering any fair assessment of its weight subject to the need to take into account all the evidence in its complete form that the Crown relies on. 60 Equally, the defendant's legal adviser must reach an independent view on the available evidence. At a Preliminary Hearing it is not possible to appreciate the strength of the prosecution evidence in the face of denials by the client and instructions from the solicitor that it is to be a trial, because, as was the case here, disclosure will be incomplete. In spite of this unassailable reality, the Judge ordered that the matter be adjourned until after the lunch recess, by which time, West was required to return to court, whereas prosecution counsel was released from attending.
This encounter raises a number of questions, not least, the extent to which a judge can Civ 1148, at para. 113: '…it is in my respectful view seductively easy to conclude that there can be no answer to a case of which you have only heard one side. There can be few practising lawyers who have not had the experience of resuming their seat in a state of hubristic satisfaction, having called a respectable witness to give apparently cast-iron evidence, only to see it reduced to wreckage by ten minutes of wellinformed cross-examination or convincingly explained away by the other side's testimony. Some have appeared in cases in which everybody was sure of the defendant's guilt, only for fresh evidence to emerge which makes it clear that they were wrong. As Mark Twain said, the difference between reality and fiction is that fiction has to be credible. In a system which recruits its judges from practitioners, judges need to carry this kind of sobering experience to the bench. It reminds them that you cannot be sure of anything until all the evidence has been heard, and that even then you may be wrong'.
court hearing is mandated in the absence of both the instructing solicitor and prosecution counsel?
Remembering that West's client had insisted in pleading 'not guilty', it is submitted that -in light of the Code of Conduct under which all barristers must operate 62 -West had two options open to him but only one appropriate course of action. The first option would be to accept his client's instructions, subject to conflicting evidence which West considered necessary (at that stage) to discuss with his client. This approach would be correct.
The second option would be to reengage his client in light of the Judge's directions, specifically focusing on prosecution-summarized 'evidence' that the Judge, by raising admissibility issues, had highlighted as problematic for the accused. In the event that a 'not guilty' indication continued to be maintained, court time would have been wasted, falling foul of the CrimPR. In the event the accused swiftly changes his indication of plea to 'guilty', the barrister ought to remain under a duty to advise his client to enter no plea (at that stage), as he is entitled, until further disclosure is made available by the prosecution 63 . This is for two reasons. Firstly, no barrister can properly advise on the evidence until they have had an opportunity to gauge it collectively, rather than Similarly valid is the concern that the Judge, having highlighted a specific area of the evidence requiring further discussion, might be seen to be signaling a pro-prosecution disposition. 65 Under such circumstances, it would be proper for (and indeed incumbent The supplementary argument that West was being asked to return to court as a 'punitive measure only,' though carrying some force was rejected by Judge Kelson as 'deluded'.
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It appears, however, that not only was the defence solicitor's presence not really given due weight but if the Judge's genuine intention was to 'case manage the case properly'
and have an effective hearing it is unclear why prosecution counsel was excused from further attendance.
Contempt Proceedings
On 25 th April, summary contempt proceedings against West were brought during which the Judge decided that the barrister was in contempt of court, and fined him £500 for 'conscious defiance' of his 'firm order'. 68 Hearing the contempt case, the Judge said West's behaviour was 'far over-stepping the mark in courageously representing' the defendant. 69 West's 'deeply unpleasant style of advocacy' was 'highly impertinent and somewhat confrontational, if not pugnacious'. contended that: (i) the Judge had erred in failing to recuse himself, as the exchanges on the 14 th and 15 th of April, had given the appearance of partiality; (ii) the fairness of the contempt hearing had been jeopardised by the Judge's reference to authorities and materials about which he had not given notice or invited submissions, in particular, the case management and contempt provisions of the CrimPR; and (iii) the Judge had not adhered to the contempt provisions of the CrimPR.
The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, summarily dismissed the first contention.
Despite the fact that, as Judge Kelson conceded, it would not have been 'too difficult' to put the contempt case over to another full-time judge and that Judge Kelson offered no reason for not doing so except to state (perhaps remarkably in a case involving alleged contempt by a barrister) '…this is simply not required in this case,' and given the clear evidence of displeasure that the Judge developed towards West, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Judge's finding that West had been 'impertinent' had not demonstrated an inability impartially to determine whether the conduct constituted a contempt of court. The Court rationalized its stance by the determination that 'it is not merely the words uttered (which can be read on the transcript) but also the way in which this exchange occurred that is relevant: only the judge was in a position to assess that feature.' 73 This is nonsense because otherwise it would preclude any other judge from hearing the contempt charge. Indeed, it is falsified by the fact that Judge Kelson himself accepted that he could have put the contempt hearing over to another judge.
If the Judge's posture was not manifest to the Court of Appeal at the Preliminary
Hearing (doubts about which would be removed by the transcript), any acquaintance with the contempt proceedings in which West's conduct was characterized, inter alia, as 'conscious defiance', 'deeply unpleasant', 'highly impertinent', 'somewhat confrontational, if not pugnacious', would surely have been of the utmost relevance.
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The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed this, proceeding to depict his conduct in even more damning language than that used by the Judge ('more than merely impertinent', 'breathtaking arrogance', 'serious misconduct of a type that is wholly inimical to the proper discharge of his professional duties', 'worthy of serious sanction').
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To the extent that it was argued that the Judge could not range beyond the authorities cited, the defendant's submission, the Court of Appeal rightly said, went too far. Forthcoming
not an unusual occurrence that judicial research revealed additional relevant authority and it was a matter of judgment whether, in a particular case, the parties should be given notice and allowed to address further argument. In the circumstances, as everyone had appreciated, case management had been at the core of the Judge's complaint and it was remarkable to suggest that reference to the contempt provisions of the CrimPR could or should have taken anyone by surprise.
However, the email informing the defendant of the contempt hearing had clearly fallen short of the procedural requirements set out in the CrimPR. 76 In cases of alleged contempt, strict observance of the provisions was essential. 77 Accordingly, the failure of process invalidated the conclusion the Judge had reached.
In allowing the appeal on a technicality regarding notice in Rule 62 (which West expressly did not raise through his counsel) 78 , yet proceeding to condemn his conduct, the We have no doubt that the temperature of the exchange increased as it proceeded:
that was entirely the responsibility of the appellant and, on the following day, to require an apology of the judge was more than merely impertinent.
To hammer home that such conduct would not be tolerated, the Court of Appeal directed that a copy of the Court's judgment be sent to the BSB (thereby potentially influencing the direction the disciplinary body might take). Judge Kelson, it was said, had operated with 'perfect propriety' alongside a prosecution the Court congratulated as 'truly exemplary' (which to others might appear excessive in light of the non-requirement to attend the adjourned hearing on the 14 th April and the unprepared state of the prosecution the following day) 82 .
Rather than analyse the scope of 'independent' legal advice in the particular context of representation the barrister found himself in, the Court of Appeal in its final words chose to portray West as a systemic threat: 83 …[his conduct], if it was to become the norm, will cause our present system to collapse for want of sufficient funding with the risk causing enormous damage 82 Mr Dryden, acting for the Crown on the 15 th April, was, in the words of Judge Kelson, 'uninstructed' and unable to deal with the substantive issue of bail. When asked if he could help as to why the defendant was in custody prosecution counsel replied: '…the short answer is I cannot… I was only informed a short time ago that this case was being mentioned… I do not have any papers. I do not think the Crown has any papers in the building today' (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, p.7 lines 7-10). 83 Notwithstanding that the court allowed the appeal on a procedural irregularity.
and replacement by a process that imperils many of the hard gained improvements designed with the interests of justice in mind. 84 This conclusion raises questions as to how the application of the CrimPR risks attenuating the rights of defence lawyers in criminal cases. West's high level of advocacy experience was held in such low regard as to be subverted to a risk, not, it should be noted, to the adversarial system, but to the guilty plea process that has in large measure replaced it. And to re-characterize this process as having been designed with the 'interests of justice' in mind is surely contradicted by the history of plea bargaining and the justifications advanced by judges on its behalf. 85 The 'example' made of West, itself an overbearing threat to less-experienced barristers, is at risk of being further exploited as ammunition in the continued attack against defence lawyers.
Conclusion
The traditional role of criminal defence lawyers has been to stand between the State and their defendant clients. But the modern practices of criminal courts, combined with the CrimPR, now dictate a change to that position. The interpretation of the CrimPR in West is confirmation that criminal advocates must re-assess where they stand in relationship to the accused as their natural sense of purpose fades. 84 West, Re [2014] [at 55] (emphasis added). 85 Although the link between defence advocacy and system failure is apparently not lost on members of the Criminal Court of Appeal: 'The criminal justice system in this country requires the highest quality advocates… The better the advocates, the easier it is to concentrate on the real issues in the case, the more expeditious the hearing and the better the prospect of true verdicts according to the evidence. Poor quality advocates fail to take points of potential significance, or take them badly, leading to confusion and, in turn, appeals and, even more serious, leading to potential miscarriages of justice', R The extent to which a judge can intrude into the sensitive exercise of client representation remains unknown. The starkest warning sign in this regard, and the provision upon which the Court of Appeal relied, is Rule 3.5 (1) of the CrimPR which provides: '…the court may give any direction and take any step actively to manage a case unless that direction or step would be inconsistent with legislation, including these Rules'. 91 As is clear from this, defence lawyers are constrained by a dominant power, itself subject only to an express statutory measure (already thin on the ground) and qualifications whose ambit is as yet under-specified. 92 Rule 3.5 led the Court in West to determine the issue through a singular lens. In doing so it was inevitable that it would skew the way in which the Court would view that fateful Preliminary Hearing so that, for example, the Judge's own admission that he (regularly) seeks to 'tease out guilty pleas' was re-labelled neutrally as an 'admission' or 'other sensible resolution of the case'.
Underlying the CrimPR therefore lie important constitutional questions. Under the cloak of a statute which authorized the making of rules with a view to securing that 'the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient', 93 the judge-led and judge-laden evident since the Star Chamber and which few institutions possess in a democratic society. What other body or institution is able to 'give any direction and take any step' in pursuance of its self-selected goal 94 , the more so when the source of the power is an unelected judiciary?
The application of the CrimPR and its anti-adversarial ideology is accordingly a matter of public concern. This is particularly so as the degradation of counsel's role is only likely to exacerbate following the publication of the Leveson Review, its terms of reference being to 'to identify ways to streamline and modernise the process of criminal justice' the remit of which includes strengthening further the CrimPR so that 'maximum efficiency… from every participant within the system' is achieved and that 'any changes proposed are fully supported by the Rules' 95 .
Indeed the Leveson Review is explicit as to its aim to 'encourage a reduced tolerance for failure to comply with Court directions along with a recognition of the role and responsibilities of the Judge in matters of case management' with the recommendation that sanctions for failures to comply with the CrimPR are bolstered, 96 proper instructions and progress expeditiously: furthermore, it will be incumbent upon 99 The shallow discussion therein, however, simply adds to the concern that senior judges have little love of jury trial. Such data as were available to the Review bearing on the issue of cost-effectiveness (the experiences of trial judges at Southwark Crown Court), for example, are brushed aside by Leveson on the extraordinary ground that it is 'not implausible' to reach an opposite conclusion (para. 357). Of course, it is not implausible to reach an opposite conclusion on almost any issue but that is not a justification in and of itself for any opposite conclusion reached. See also the discussion of the right of election for jury trial at paras. 336-342 which is not rescued by the superficial disclaimer at para.3 that the issues are raised only to suggest that they be revisited and that how far any are taken forward 'depends on policy decisions upon which, at least in part, it is not appropriate for a serving Judge who has not specifically been asked to review legislation to express a concluded view'. 100 Leveson Review, section 2.1, p.9. 101 Leveson Review, para 25, p.9. Although Leveson's overarching principle is written in the conditional ('If they [the gatekeepers] make appropriate charging decisions, based on fair appraisal of sufficient evidence, with proportionate disclosure of material to the defence, considerable delay can be eradicated' (emphasis added)), he is advancing this principle on the basis that the relevant groups make the 'right' decisions. The weakness is not the principle but the failure to recognise the reasons (institutional corruption, flawed assessment mechanisms, technical competence, etc) why the parties do not get 'it' (whatever that is) right. 
